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Abstract 
 
By modifying slightly a standard neoclassical-synthesis macroeconomic model, this 
paper investigates the effects of an adverse supply or demand shock on output, 
employment, investment, prices, interest rates, and the exchange rate. The paper 
focuses on the possibility of the magnification of these effects by the media, the 
politicians, and the political analysts, who induce herd-behavior by overstating the 
size of the shock. I find that such behavior destabilizes the economy by magnifying 
the amplitude of the business cycle and by hurting private investment, which might 
cause expansions to be shorter and contractions to last longer. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It has long been recognized that the media (television, newspapers, etc.) do not always 
report plain facts. In their effort to tell a simple and memorable story that is consistent 
with a prevailing view, they often end up exaggerating. Reference [1] dubbed this 
type of media bias “spin” and [2] notes that sentiments about current and future 
economic conditions can be magnified by spin.  
In addition to the media, other institutions may also cause spin. For example, the 
incumbent political party, whose policies have failed and the economy’s deficits have 
reached unsustainable levels, might blame it on the “economic crisis” imported from 
abroad, because of a small negative shock that has occurred in the global economy, 
although that shock could not have caused more than a mild recession. Political 
analysts invited by the media to comment on the “economic crisis” may also focus on 
explaining what happened and why it can get worse, rather than risking their 
reputation by expressing a different view based on their own signals (see [3], p. 181). 
Such “herd behavior” can magnify the effects of the shock and can cause economic 
agents to adjust their expectations of economic activity downwards and to reduce their 
spending much more than they should, thus fulfilling these expectations. This is a 
likely outcome assuming “bounded rationality” on the part of economic agents, who 
would be faced with high “deliberation costs” if they were to assess the true economic 
conditions in a fully rational manner (see [4]).  
In this paper, I modify slightly a standard neoclassical-synthesis macroeconomic 
model in order to investigate the effects of an adverse supply or demand shock on 
output, employment, investment, prices, interest rates, and the exchange rate. The 
paper focuses on how these effects can be magnified by the newsmakers and the 
experts, who often induce herd-behavior by overstating the size of the shock. I find 
that such behavior destabilizes the economy in that it adversely affects the amplitude 
of the business cycle and possibly its duration. To my knowledge, this has not been 
done in the literature. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
 
I begin by adopting a standard IS–LM–BP model accompanied by the supply side of 
the economy. In what follows, lower-case letters denote desired quantities (in real 
terms). Let xg, xm, xfx denote excess demands for goods and services, money, and 
foreign exchange, respectively. 
The equation that describes the IS curve is xg = c + i + g + (ex – im) – y = 0, where 
c = private consumption, i = private investment, g = government purchases, ex = 
exports, im = imports, and y = output. By defining c = y – t – s, where t = taxes and s 
= saving, one can write the IS equation as xg = i – s + (g – t) + (ex – im) = 0. The 
government deficit, g – t, is assumed to be exogenous, whereas the other variables that 
appear in this equation are assumed to be determined as follows. 
First, investment depends positively on output and negatively on the ex-ante real 
interest rate, r – πe, where r = nominal interest rate and πe = expected inflation rate, 
i.e., πe = (Pe – Ρ–1)/Ρ–1, where Ρ = price level, and P
e
 = expected price level. That is, i 
= i(r – πe, y), with partial derivatives i1 < 0 and i2 > 0. 
Second, the saving function is s = s(y – t), where s' > 0. Third, the export function 
is ex = ex(E×P*/P), where ex' > 0, E×P*/P = real exchange rate, E = nominal exchange 
rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency), and P* = foreign 
price level. Fourth, the import function is im = im(E×P*/P, y – t), where im1 < 0 and 
im2 > 0. Thus, the IS equation can be written as 
 
IS:   xg = i(r – π
e
, y) – s(y – t) + (g – t) 
+ ex(E×P*/P) – im(E×P*/P, y – t) = 0. (1) 
  
 Now consider the LM equation. Assume a flexible exchange-rate regime, so that 
the balance of payments does not affect the money supply (M). Assume also that the 
money demand function is m
d
 = m
d
(y, r), where m1
d
 > 0 and m2
d
 < 0. Thus, the LM 
equation can be written as 
 
LM:  xm = m
d
(y, r) – M/P = 0. (2) 
 
 Next, consider the BP equation. Since a flexible exchange-rate regime is assumed 
here, this equation can be written as 
  
BP:   xfx = im(E×P
*/P, y – t) – ex(E×P*/P) 
– k(r – r* – eEˆ ) = 0, (3) 
 
where k(r – r*– eEˆ ) is net capital inflow, assumed to be a positive function of the open 
interest differential, r – r*– eEˆ , i.e., k' > 0, r* = foreign interest rate, and eEˆ = 
expected percentage change in E. This completes the demand side of the economy. 
 On the supply side, assume a standard short-run production function:  
 
y = F(N, K ),  FN > 0, FK > 0, FNΝ < 0, FKK < 0, (4)   
 
where N = employment and K = capital stock (assumed to be constant in the short-
run). Letting W denote the nominal wage, the labor demand function is 
 
W/P = FN(N, K ), (5)  
 
whereas the labor supply function is 
 
W/P
e
 = g(N), g′ > 0. (6) 
 
Solving the last two equations for W; imposing equilibrium in the labor market (N
s
 = 
N
d
 = NE); and assuming (for simplicity) static expectations,1 i.e., Pe = P–1, yields 
 
P×FN(N, K ) = P–1×g(N). (7) 
 
3. The Model with a Supply Shock 
 
Considering (7) as an implicit function of N, one can solve for equilibrium 
employment (NE) and write:  
                                                 
1
 This expectations scheme is a special case of the adaptive-expectations model, which is consistent 
with the assumption of “bounded rationality” introduced in Section 1 (see [4,5]). As [6, pp. 233-234] 
points out, “bounded rationality leads agents to replace optimizing behavioral rules with relatively 
inflexible rules of thumb,” because “agents have limited decision-making capabilities.”   
 NE = N(P, P–1, K ), NΡ > 0, NΡ–1 < 0, NΚ > 0. (8) 
 
The assumptions NΡ > 0 and NΚ > 0 are standard, whereas the assumption NΡ–1 < 0 is 
made because a higher price level in the previous period means a higher expected 
price level for the current period (since P
e
 = P–1), thus inducing higher wage demands 
and reducing this period’s labor supply, while leaving labor demand unchanged.  
Actual employment (N) may differ from equilibrium employment (NE), however, 
because of a shock, ε, which has two effects on N: the effect of the shock itself and a 
herd-behavior effect, σε, which might occur in the aftermath of the shock. The role of 
the parameter σ, where σ ≥ 0, is to allow for a magnification of the herd-behavior 
effect, and its size depends on the intensity with which the shock is propagated by the 
media. That is, assume 
 
N = NE
 
+ (1 + σ)ε, σ ≥ 0. (9) 
 
The novelty of this paper is the presence of the term (1 + σ)ε on the right-hand side 
of (9). This term differentiates the present model from a standard neoclassical-
synthesis one. Equation (9) says that actual employment is determined not only by the 
fundamentals of the labor market, which determine equilibrium employment (NE), but 
also by a shock to the labor market (ε), e.g., a technological shock, an institutional 
shock, and the like. Because the precise measurement of the shock is costly, however, 
economic agents do not use their own estimate of the size of the shock, but rely on 
experts’ opinion, namely the media, the politicians, and the political analysts, who 
often magnify the size of the shock -- the herd-behavior effect discussed earlier, 
implying that the parameter σ may be a large positive number. 
To understand the twofold effect of the shock described above, consider the 
following example.
2
 Suppose there is a large negative shock to the labor market (a 
large negative value of ε), say because of a new tax on corporations, which raises their 
costs and leads them to reduce their level of employment. Even if the value of σ is 
zero, in which case the herd-behavior effect is zero, corporations will reduce their 
level of employment. If σ is a large positive number, however, which implies a large 
herd-behavior effect, then all firms in the economy (including small businesses) may 
expect an economy-wide fall in income, and hence a fall in the demand for their 
products, so employment may be reduced still further.  
Substituting (8) into (9) yields the following employment equation: 
 
N = N(P, P–1, K ) + (1 + σ)ε. (10) 
 
The “work-horse” model used in this section consists of (1)-(4) and (10). Note that 
investment is actually a function of r (not of r – πe), since πe = 0, thanks to the static 
expectations assumption, P
e
 = P–1. The endogenous variables of the model are y, N, P, 
r, and E. Totally differentiating (1)-(4) and (10); assuming that the autonomous parts 
of the functions i, s, ex, im, m
d
, k, F, and N do not change (e.g., 0id , 0sd , etc.); 
and also assuming that  
 
                                                 
2
 In a previous version of the paper, the effect of the shock itself was ignored, and only the herd-
behavior effect (σε) was present in (9), thus obscuring the distinction between the two effects. I am 
grateful to Peter Ireland for pointing out this problem to me, and for providing me with this example. 
0ˆ**1
eEddrdMdPdgdtKddP , (11) 
 
which leaves dε as the only exogenous change in the system, yields the following 
system of equations in matrix form:  
 
ddE
dr
dP
dN
dy
N
F
P
P
imexk
P
EP
imexim
m
P
M
m
P
P
imexi
P
EP
imeximsi
P
N
dd
)1(
0
0
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0010
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221
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. (12) 
 
 The determinant of this system is 
 
P
P
imexAΔ
*
1)'( , (13) 
where  
212211
)'()]'()'([
P
M
kisimkimNFA ddPN . (14) 
 
The signs of A and Δ are negative if the following condition holds:  
 
s  > i2. (15) 
 
In the standard saving-investment diagram, taught in introductory macroeconomics 
courses, (15) is often imposed when illustrating the “paradox of thrift,” so it can be 
called the “paradox-of-thrift condition.” In those courses, (15) can also be viewed as a 
prima facie condition for the equilibrium output and the autonomous-spending 
multiplier to be positive numbers. Thus, it is not an unreasonable condition, and is 
assumed to hold here, implying that Δ < 0 and A < 0.3 
 Using Cramer’s rule, one can now calculate the differentials dy, dN, dP, dr, and 
dΕ, and then the partial derivatives y/ ε, N/ ε, P/ ε, r/ ε, and Ε/ ε. One can also 
calculate the derivative i/ ε = i1( r/ ε) + i2( y/ ε). The results are as follows: 
 
,0)'()1(
21
1
P
M
kiFA
y
N  (16) 
 
                                                 
3
 Note that in the more restrictive models where income does not enter the investment function, i.e., 
when i2 = 0, (15) is automatically satisfied, since the marginal propensity to save (s ) is always assumed 
to be a positive number (between zero and one). 
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 Consider a negative shock, i.e., dε < 0. Equations (16)-(21) predict that output, 
employment, and investment will fall; the price level and the interest rate will rise; 
whereas the effect on the exchange rate is ambiguous. This ambiguity is not 
surprising, however. On the one hand, the increase in the interest rate improves the 
capital account, thus pushing the currency to appreciate, an effect that is strengthened 
by the decrease in output, which improves the current account. On the other hand, the 
increase in the price level implies a real appreciation of the currency, thus worsening 
the current account and causing the currency to depreciate.  
Note that each of the above effects equals the sum of the corresponding effect in 
the absence of herd-behavior (i.e., when σ = 0) plus the latter effect times σ. Thus, σ 
measures the extent of destabilization of the economy induced by herd-behavior, 
which magnifies the amplitude of the business cycle. Herd behavior might also 
adversely affect the duration of the business cycle, because, according to (21), it hurts 
private investment, and this is expected to cause expansions to be shorter and 
contractions to last longer (see [7]).  
 
4. The Model with a Demand Shock 
 
The approach of the previous section is now applied to the case of a demand shock. In 
particular, a negative financial shock is considered. Examples include a series of bank 
failures, which reduce the money supply; a switch of the public from bonds to money, 
which increases the demand for money; and the like. In this case, the equation for the 
LM curve, (2), is modified as follows: 
 
 md(y, r) – [M/P – (1+φ)η] = 0,  φ ≥ 0, (22) 
 
where η is the shock and φ is a parameter that plays the role of the parameter σ in the 
previous section. Since there is no supply shock in this case, (10) is simply written as 
 
N = N(P, P–1, K ). (23) 
 The remaining equations of the previous section’s model are used here without any 
change. Thus, the “work-horse” model of this section consists of (1), (22), (3), (4), 
and (23), where investment is again a function of r (not of r – πe). Again, totally 
differentiating these equations and solving for the endogenous variables (dy, dN, dP, 
dr, and dE) yields a system which differs from (12) only in that the right-hand-side 
vector has –(1+φ)dη as its second element [since (22) is second in the system] and 
zeros elsewhere. Thus, the expressions for Δ and A in (13) and (14) remain 
unchanged. Using Cramer’s rule, one can calculate the following partial derivatives:  
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Since an adverse financial shock is assumed here (dη > 0), (24)-(29) predict that 
output, employment, prices, and investment will fall, whereas the interest rate will 
rise. As for the effect on the exchange rate, there is no ambiguity in this case. The 
currency will appreciate on three counts: higher interest rates improve the capital 
account, whereas lower output and lower prices both improve the current account. 
Like the parameter σ of the previous section, the parameter φ measures the extent of 
destabilization of the economy induced by herd-behavior.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
By modifying slightly a version of the neoclassical-synthesis model, this paper 
investigates the effects of a supply or demand shock on output, employment, 
investment, prices, interest rates, and the exchange rate. The paper focuses on the role 
of the parameters that measure the herd-behavior effects of the shock, induced by the 
media, the politicians, and the political analysts, who often overstate the size of the 
shock. I find that if, in the absence of herd-behavior, the effect of the shock on one of 
these variables is α, then, in the presence of such behavior, it is α plus the product of α 
times the parameter that captures herd-behavior. I conclude that herd behavior is 
destabilizing, since it magnifies the amplitude of the business cycle. It might also 
adversely affect the duration of the business cycle, since adverse supply or demand 
shocks are found to hurt investment, and this can cause expansions to be shorter and 
contractions to last longer. 
 Of course, in addition to herd behavior, other causes of shock magnification might 
also be at work, thus turning into a depression what would otherwise be only a mild 
recession. Changes in attitudes, uncertainty about upcoming government regulations, 
and other structural changes that may be in operation simultaneously with the shock, 
may influence its effect. For example,
4
 the three most recent recoveries in the United 
States (1991, 2001, and 2009-2010) have been dubbed “jobless recoveries” because 
output growth was not accompanied by a significant job growth, a phenomenon that 
can be explained by an expansion in labor productivity. It is possible that during these 
recessions and the ensuing recovery periods managers altered their rehiring policies 
and that this extended the recovery periods and had nothing to do with herd behavior. 
Reference [8] argues that job losses that stem from structural changes (e.g., a 
permanent fall in demand, technological change, reorganization of production, and the 
like) are permanent, so the jobs added during a recovery are mostly newly created 
positions, not rehires. Creating new jobs, however, takes longer than simply recalling 
laid-off workers, and is riskier because at the beginning of a recovery there is a lot of 
uncertainty whether the increase in demand will continue. Thus, structural changes 
can prolong periods of high unemployment, especially when there is no productivity 
growth. 
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